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1. INTRODUCTION

Judicial independence is a much discussed and vaunted principle, but it is very difficult to obtain a clear or shared definition of
what it means. To Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts (PMC),
judicial independence means the ability of a judge or justice to
perform the judicial function-ruling on motions; deciding cases;
overseeing hearings, trials, and oral arguments; and making decisions that affect litigants-free from the influences of personal
bias, popular opinion, political pressure, the desires of campaign
supporters, or anything other than a full and fair reading of the
law as applied to the facts at hand. This is both a lofty principle
and the most basic definition of a judge's sworn duty. Unfortunately, judicial independence is not always easy to achieve or
maintain.
One of the great threats to judicial independence in Pennsylvania is the manner in which judges are selected. Pennsylvania is
one of six states that select all judges in partisan elections.'
Pennsylvania uses a judicial selection system that from the outset
creates special challenges to the ability of judges to achieve and
maintain judicial independence.
Judges are different from other elected officials who serve in the
executive and legislative branches. Electing judges, however, diminishes the distinction between judges and other elected officials. By treating judges like other elected officials as they strive
to reach the bench, Pennsylvania has chosen a system that ignores
the differences inherent in the judicial role. The danger is that
the more we treat judicial candidates like candidates for other
elected offices, the more that judges will be perceived to be just
like other elected officials. Or, as former United States Supreme
Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has said, electing judges leads
2
the public to believe that 'judges are II politicians in robes."

1. The other five states that elect all judges in partisan elections are Texas, West
Virginia, Louisiana, Illinois and Alabama. See American Judicature Society, Methods of
Selection,
Judicial
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial-selection/methods/selection-ofjudges.cfm?state=~
(last visited Aug. 23, 2010).
2. Sandra Day O'Connor, Assoc. Justice, Ret., Supreme Court of the United States,
The Essentials and Expendables of the Missouri Plan, The 2009 Earl F. Nelson Lecture at
the Univ. of Missouri Scb. of Law (Feb. 27, 2009), in 74 Mo. L. REV. 479, 488-89 (2009).
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Several recent United States Supreme Court cases and their
progeny have had and will increasingly continue to have the effect
of undermining judicial independence in states that elect their
judges. The clear trend in the case law reflects a seemingly conscious disregard for the differences between judges and other
elected officials. The federal courts are challenging judicial election states to live with the consequences of their decision to elect
judges. 3
In Pennsylvania, these consequences have included more expensive, partisan, divisive elections. This experience has increased
concerns that the electoral process-specifically fundraising and
campaign contributions-will have an influence on future Judicial
decision making.
Living with the consequences in Pennsylvania leads to one conclusion: the solution that is designed to promote and protect longterm judicial independence. Stop electing judges-particularly
appellate court judges-and change to a process designed to get
the most qualified, fair, and impartial judges on the bench; Merit
Selection, a hybrid system that incorporates elements of appointment and elective systems and adds a citizens nominating commission to evaluate and recommend candidates. Merit Selection is
a system proven to promote and protect judicial independence and
eliminate the damaging effects of electing judges while maintaining public input in the process of selecting judges.
Section 11 of this article will identify the inherent differences between judges and other officials and delineate how the electoral
process erects special challenges to judicial independence. Section
III will discuss the evolution of the judicial election process from
one that recognized and protected the differences inherent in the
judicial role to one that is steadily refusing to recognize those differences. Section IV will focus on the special problem of the role of
money in judicial elections and the unique threats the fundraising
Section V presents
process creates for judicial independence.
PMC's conclusion that judicial elections and judicial independence
are increasingly becoming mutually exclusive, and it offers a challenge to Pennsylvania as well as a solution for protecting and
maintaining judicial independence.

3. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U~S 765, 792 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("If the State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State
brought upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges."); Weaver v.
Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th cir. 2002).
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11. How DIFFERENT ARE JUDGES REALLY, AND How ARE THOSE
DIFFERENCES IMPACTED BY JUDICIAL ELECTIONS?

Judges are different from elected officials in the legislative and
executive branches. The difference is inherent in the judicial role,
which requires a judge to impartially decide disputes between adversarial parties. Recognizing that judges are different is not very
controversial. Indeed, even members of the United States Supreme Court have acknowledged that judges perform a unique
role in society that is unlike that of the other two political
branches:
There is a critical difference between the work of the
judge and the work of other public officials. In a democracy, issues of policy are properly decided by majority
vote; it is the business of legislators and executives to be
popular. But in litigation, issues of law or fact should
not be determined by popular vote; it is the business of
judges to be indifferent to unpopularity."4
Unlike legislators, mayors, and governors, judges are not supposed to have constituencies. We support and vote for legislators
and executive branch leaders based on their positions on hotbutton issues and their stated intentions about how they will deal
with those issues when they take office. We cannot do the same
for judges, for they are not allowed to tell us what they will do in

office. 5
Although other elected officials are expected to make campaign
trail promises and are evaluated based on whether they keep
4. Whiie, 536 U.S. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Judges ... are not political actors. They do not sit as representatives of particular persons, communities, or parties; they serve no faction or constituency. '[I]t is the business of judges to be indifferent to popularity."' (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,
401 n.29 (1991)).
5. See, e.g., 35.-PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 7B(1)(c) (2008):
(1) Candidates, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is filled either
by public election between competing candidates or on the basis of a merit system
election:
(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful
and impartial performance of the duties of the office; make statements that commit
the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court; or misrepresent their identity, qualifications, present position, or other
fact.
Id.
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those promises, judges are generally prohibited from promising
anything but the faithful performance of their duties. 6 Judges owe
their fidelity to the law, not to the political parties that endorsed
them, the citizens who voted for them, or the donors who supported their campaigns.
Judicial independence is both a real commodity and a perceived
one. It can be squandered or increased by judicial action. But the
perception of judicial independence can also be lost or enhanced,
without any action by a judge.
It is not enough that judges decide cases free from bias, outside
influence, political pressure, popular will, and personal biasthough certainly that is the primary ideal underpinning our judicial system. The public must perceive and believe that judges do
so. When the public perceives that judges are independent and
decide cases free from any outside influence, this belief actually
bolsters and increases judicial legitimacy and, by extension, judicial independence. This is because public confidence that judicial
decisions are fair and impartial increases the ability of the courts
to make difficult, unpopular decisions-that is, to continue to exercise independence.
The converse also is true. Even an erroneous public perception
that judges are not acting independently, that the courts are subject to outside pressures and influences, can weaken the courts.
As one commentator has wisely explained, "Where the courts are
concerned, if it looks bad it is bad, so don't do it. In the legal system, fairness is paramount and the appearance of fairness is..
whatever comes right under paramount."7
Studies demonstrate that individuals who live in states that
elect judges are more cynical about their courts and are more likely to believe that "judges are just politicians in robes." 8 We believe
this is because judicial elections embody several simultaneous
threats to the ability of future judges to maintain and protect judicial independence.

6. See, e.g., id.
7. Ron Dzwonkowski, When Cash, Courts, and Politics Mix, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb.
22, 2009, availableat http://www.mcfn.org/related.php?artice=1859.
8. See, e.g., THE ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF AND
SUPPORT
FOR
THE
COURTS
2
(2007),
available
at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/Judiciary/documents/finalversionJUDICALFINDINGSoct
1707.pdf.
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The Money Problem

First and foremost is the money problem. It is a fact that Judicial campaigns must raise money to operate. In a large state like
Pennsylvania, with sixty-seven counties, it takes tremendous resources to run a statewide campaign for the appellate courts, with
the attendant staff, travel, mass mailing, and television and radio
advertising expenses. 9
In recent years, elections have gotten even more expensive, and
the fundraising wars have escalated. In 2009, the two candidates
for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court together raised nearly $4.7
million, including in-kind contributions such as media buys, donated postage, transportation, and any other non-cash donations.' 0 Interestingly, during this campaign, the candidates themselves were arguing about the money and whether "justice is for
sale.""'
In 2007, four candidates for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
raised close to $8 million, including in-kind contributions. 1 2 That
number is a record for total money raised in a Pennsylvania Supreme Court election, but the 2009 election fundraising set a
record for an election with a single vacancy. 13 Moreover, in 2007,
now Justice Seamus McCaffery set a new fundraising record,
bringing in $2,340,350.78.14 However, that record was broken
during the very next Supreme Court election in 2009, when Judge
Panella raised $2,705,365.01.15
The unavoidable truth is that the most frequent contributors to
judicial campaigns are lawyers; law firms; and entities like businesses, unions, and special interest groups (including political
parties) that are likely to appear in court before the judges they
helped to elect.' 6 A newly released study by the American Judica9. See Shira Goodman & Lynn Marks, Are Pennsylvania's Judges for Sale?,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 1, 2009, at B4.
Election,
Pennsylvania
Current
Courts,
Modern
for
10. Pennsylvanians
bttp://www.pmeonline.org/node/48, (last visited Aug. 18, 2010) (calculations based on campaign finance reports filed with the Pennsylvania Department of State).
11. Joan Orie Melvin, Justice, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Statement made before
Pennsylvania Press Club (Oct. 26, 2009) ("It's pay to play, it's justice for sale.").
Election,
Pennsylvania
Current
12. JudgesonMerit.org,
http://www.pmconline.org/node/48/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Current Pennsylvania Election, supra note 10.
16. LINDA CASEY, HIGH COURT CONTESTS: COMPETITION, CONTROVERSY AND CASH IN
at
available
(2009).
9
WISCONSIN
AND
PENNSYLVANIA
9
http://www.followthemoney.org/press/ReportView.phtml?r=3 0.
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ture Society (AdS) of the 82 civil cases decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court during the 2008 and 2009 sessions found a
striking overlap between contributors to the election campaigns of
the sitting justices and those who later appeared before the Court
as a lawyer, law firm, or party:
* In 60% of the cases, at least one of the litigants, lawyers, or law firms had contributed to the election campaign of at least one justice.
& In nearly one-third of the cases (32%) a single litigant,
lawyer, or law firm had contributed to at least four of the
six elected justices' election campaigns, which represents
a majority of the court. 17
These numbers are eye-opening and are likely to actually underreport the overlap because the AJS study only counted contributions from lawyer and law firm political action committees (PACs).
This captured contributions by lawyers and law firms to justices
made via those PACs, but it did not account for such indirect contributions to the justices that came via other PACs, which also
18
might have been funded by lawyers, law firms, and litigants.
The fact that campaign contributions that helped elect the presiding judges and justices were made by lawyers, law firms, and
parties in the courtroom undermines public trust in the indepenIn 2009, a USA Todence and impartiality of the courts.
day/Gallup poll reported that 89% of respondents called the influence of campaign contributions on judges' rulings "a problem." 1 9
But this perception is not new. A 1998 poll commissioned by a
special commission of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court revealed
that nearly 90% of Pennsylvanians believe that campaign contri20
butions affect judicial decision making at least some of the time.
17. American Judicature Society, Campaign Contributors and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, http://www.ajs.org/selectionjnc/docs/AJS-PAstudy3- 18- 10.pdf (last visited
Aug. 18, 2010) (noting that Pennsylvania's Supreme Court has seven justices; during 2008
and 2009, six of the sitting justices were elected and one was appointed to fill an interim
vacancy).
18. American Judicature Society, supra note 17. ("Non-legal PACs, including political
party PACs, provided nearly $2.9 million, or 36 percent, of the campaign dollars raised by
[the] justices serving on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2008 and 2009.").
19. Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Case with the Feel of a Best Seller, USA TODAY, Feb.
16, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-02-16-grisham-court_N.htm.
20. Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts, History of Judicial Selection in PA,
http://wwwpmconline.org/node/29 (last visited Aug. 18, 2010) (citing Lake Sosin Snell
Perry & Associates and Deardourff/The Media Company Poll, Attachment to the Report of
the Supreme Court's Special Commission to Limit Campaign Expenditures (1998)).
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Another national poll conducted in 2001 revealed that 76% of
Americans believe that campaign contributions influence decisions. 2 1
These numbers leave no doubt that the public believes, rightly
or wrongly, that campaign contributions and/or monetary support
to judicial campaigns casts a shadow over judges' future decision
making. This, in turn, leads the public to have less confidence
that judges are impartial and independent.
In fact, judges themselves have expressed concern about the effect of campaign contributions on judicial decision making. In
that same 2001 national poll, almost half of the 2,428 state court
judges polled reported that they believed campaign contributions
influenced decisions. 22 This number is more startling than the
data about the general public. When judges themselves express
concern about the possible effect of campaign contributions on
judicial decision making, we move from the realm of the electoral
process affecting the perception of judicial independence to the
realm of actual effects in the courtroom. As one commentator has
noted, "As soon as people start to think there's a possibility justices can be affected by campaign contributions, quickly you're at a
point where the pillars of the system can collapse." 2 3 When those
people are judges themselves, we may have reached the point of
the walls crumbling down.
B.

The Problem of ObtainingEndorsements from PoliticalParties

The second threat to judicial independence inherent in the electoral process is the critical importance of obtaining the endorsements of local and state political parties. In states like Pennsylvania that use partisan contests to elect judges, political party
endorsements are highly sought after by those seeking election to
the statewide appellate courts. 24 In the early days of the election
21. Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research Inc., Justice at Stake Frequency Questionat
available
naire,
http://www.greenbergresearch.coni/articles/1617/1412_IJAS -ntlsurvey.pdf.
22. Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research Inc., Justice at Stake-State Judges Frequency
at
available
Questionnaire,
7
http://www.greenbergresearch.coni/articles161 /1411 JASjudges.pdf.
23. Len Boselovic, Are Campaign Contributors Buying Justice?, Pi I1SBuR0H POSTGAZETTE, Sept. 21, 2008, at Al (quoting David Fawcett, attorney for Caperton in Caperton
v. Massey).
24. See, e.g. ,Greg Palmer, PanellaGoes Unopposed for Democratic Supreme Court Nom,
KEYSTONE POLITICS, Mar. 10, 2009, http://www.keystonepolitics.comJ2009/03/panella-goes-
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season, candidates travel the state, meeting with county political
parties in an effort to gain support for the statewide political party's endorsement meeting. Although winning the party's endorsement does not guarantee victory in the primary election, it
opens the door to more money and political party support in advertising and campaigning. A candidate's party affiliation and
party endorsement, in particular, are often relied on heavily by
voters who have little information about the competing candidates. 2 5
Political party affiliation should not matter when judges decide
cases. After all, once they put on the robes, judges are not supposed to be identified as Republican or Democrat. Pennsylvania
Supreme Court Justice Debra Todd expressed this eloquently in
an op-ed following the recent election to fill a vacancy on her
court:
The statue of Lady Justice . .. is often depicted holding the
balanced scales of justice and wearing a blindfold. This depiction of Lady Justice embodies the ideal that justice must be
rendered without reference to money, power, fear, favor, identity or political party. As a sitting justice of the Supreme

unopposed-for-democratic-supreme-court-nom.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2010); Peter Jackson, GOP State Judge Pick Faces Opposition, CENTRE DAILY, Feb. 8, 2009; Debra Erdley,
Pa. Supreme Court Justices Getting Rendell's Attention, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW,
April 28, 2007, 2007 WLNR 8063132; Brett Lieberman, 4 Races for Judges Test Power of
Parties, PATRIOT-NEWS, May 16, 2007; Peter Jackson, Democrats, Republicans Consider
Judicial Endorsements, CENTRE DAILY, Feb. 9, 2007.
25. See, e.g., Capitol Ideas, http:/fblogs.mcall.com/capitol -ideas/2009/0 5/the -debatecontinues-appoint-or-elect-judges.html (May 22, 2009) ("Critics say that combination of
factors has made the races the exclusive province of three constituencies: political party
insiders, lawyers, and the big business interests who often find themselves in the courtroom. So instead of the voters picking judicial candidates based on their temperament,
experience and qualifications, external factors such as geography, gender and party endorsements can often carry the day."); Bill White, Some Voters Were Paying Attention,
ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, May 21, 2009, at A19 ("I've been complaining for years about
the way we choose state judges. I'm sure the vast majority of voters Tuesday had no clue
about those candidates for Supreme, Superior and Commonwealth courts. They just
guessed. The only thing we can be sure of is that it's very helpful for these candidates to
have the support of the same party leaders who tend to run everything else in this state.");
see also David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 294
(2008) (Addressing the argument against judicial elections that asserts it is unlikely "the
public [will] be motivated to improve its knowledge of the candidates, given the extreme
unlikelihood that any particular voter will have to come before any particular judge. Public
opinion will therefore be driven by media soundbites and irrelevant or inappropriate factors; politics and appearances will win out over substance.")
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Court of Pennsylvania, I am confident that Lady Justice is
neither a card-carrying Republican-nor a Democrat. 2 6
But in Pennsylvania judicial elections, party affiliation, and political party support seem to matter quite a lot. During the 2009
Supreme Court election, the political parties emphasized the critical need to win the open seat because of the upcoming legislative
redistricting process that will likely end up before the Supreme
Court. 2 7

Indeed, Justice Todd expressed dismay that this subject

had received such extensive media attention:
I was deeply disappointed and offended when I read certain
media coverage of this month's Pennsylvania Supreme Court
election results. For example, one newspaper properly heralded Judge Joan Onie Melvin as the winner of the election
for Supreme Court justice with the headline "Onie Melvin
Wins." But the subheadline continued, "The GOP will control
state's Supreme Court after bitter race." The piece goes on to
assert that the election ended "a bitter battle for political control of the high court. 2 8
Yet, Justice Todd seems to have misattributed blame to the media
for the high attention paid to party labels. The political parties
themselves made clear how important this election was to them. 29
Indeed, one of the bigger contributors this year to the election
campaign was the state Republican Party on behalf of Joan Onie

26. Debra Todd, Lady Justice is Nonpartisan, PIPrSBURGH POST-GAzEPIE, Nov. 23,
2009, at B7.
27. Salena Zito, Judging Gender's Impact, PITTSBUJRGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, Oct. 30.
2009,
http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/pittsburgh/s -650561.html
("Both state party leaders, Republican Bob Gleason and Democrat T.J. Rooney, have called
this race vital to the future of their parties."); Tom Infield, Supreme Court Election Crucial
to Redistricting, Leaders Say, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct. 28, 2009, at Al ("Lt. Gov. Joe
Scarnati's letter to fellow Republicans on behalf of state Supreme Court candidate Joan
Onie Melvin was unusually blunt. 'Control of the Supreme Court is on the ballot this year,'
he wrote March 3, 'and you know the courts play a key role in finalizing redistricting maps
that will set the political landscape for the next decade."'); id. ("[Sitate Democratic leaders
are just as frank as top Republicans in saying that to them, the court fight is all-important.
It could influence the once-a-decade remapping of congressional and legislative districts
after the 2010 U.S. Census. . .. Abe Amoros, spokesman for the Democratic State Commit.
tee [said] 'This year, we are looking at a 4-3 majority when Jack Panella wins, which will
give us some hope at redistricting."').
28. Todd, supra note 26.
29. See, e.g., Eric Hey], Top Court Race Drips with Mud, PI I1'BURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW,
Oct.
30,
2009,
http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/columnsheyls-650598.html.
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Melvin, the victorious candidate. 3 0 Fundraising appeals by the
parties emphasized the need to win the seat in order to be prepared for the upcoming legislative redistricting battle. 31
Of course, redistricting litigation is not the only issue with partisan overtones that will reach the Supreme Court. Issues of statutory interpretation and the constitutionality of legislative action
that are presented to the Court likely will be of great interest to
the political parties. In a highly divided partisan legislature such
as Pennsylvania's, it is clear that such litigation will engage the
political parties. It must be very difficult for justices elected
through the political system, endorsed by their parties, and supported by party leaders and officials to act impartially. Perhaps
harder still, how can judges selected in such a fashion be perceived
by the public to be acting impartially and independently?
C.

The Problem of Gaining the Support of Special Interest
Groups

A third threat to judicial independence inherent in the judicial
election process is the need to curry favor with influential organizations that support or oppose candidates in judicial races. In the
wake of case law that will be discussed later in this article, judicial candidates-in addition to seeking political party endorsements-now have more work to do in order to obtain the endorsements and support of special interest groups. 3 2 In the past, some
groups would make endorsements with little information because
candidates would not speak out on the issues important to those
groups. Now, those groups have more tools at their disposal to
seek information from the candidates.
Special interest groups became very active surveying candidates
in 2003, the first Supreme Court election in Pennsylvania following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White,3 3 which loosened and eliminated
some restrictions on judicial candidates' freedom to discuss their
30. Campaign finance reports filed with the Pennsylvania Department of State reveal
that the State Republican Party spent at least $975,000 on media buys for the Onie Melvin
campaign. The reports filed by the Orie Melvin campaign report corresponding "in kind"
donations from the State Republican Party that match these numbers. The reports are
available
at
Pennsylvania
Dep't
of
State,
Campaign
Finance
Reporting,
http://www.campaignfinance.state.pa.us/ReportSearchResults.aspx?RequestlD=488074&St
artRow1I&RowsPerPage=10 (last visited Aug. 23, 2010).
31. See, e.g., Infield, supra note 277.
32. See infra pp. 833-37.

33.

536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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opinions on topics that might later come before them on the bench.
In a report on the 2003 election, PMC explained:
While some simply requested that candidates identify their
work experience, civic affiliations and relevant experience,
others, emboldened by the new judicial canons, asked probing
questions seeking clear pronouncements of candidates' positions on controversial issues that often are the subject of litigation in the state courts.34
Such questions asked for the candidates' opinions about gay marriage, the intersection of religion and the public schools, the death
penalty, and abortion. 3 5
PMC reported that other states were also beginning to see an
increased use of candidate surveys, and noted that many of the
organizations used a candidate's responses to their questions, and
even failure or refusal to respond to the surveys, as the basis for
candidate endorsements and support. 3 6 We predicted:
PMC expects to see more organizations submit increasingly
detailed surveys as the post-W~hite era continues. As groups
become more sophisticated about their questions and their
use of survey results, candidates likely will feel greater pressure to respond. It is unknown how a candidate's answers to
such surveys would later affect his or her ability to rule in future cases and whether such answers could form the basis for
recusal motions. 3 7
Recent elections in Pennsylvania have borne out this prediction,
and it has become difficult for appellate court candidates seeking
the endorsements and support of influential organizations
throughout the state to avoid answering such questionnaires.

D.

The Problem of GainingPopular Support

The fourth threat to Judicial independence inherent in the electoral process is the need to win the votes of those who go to the
34. PENNSYLVANIANS FOR MODERN COURTS, As PENNSYLVANIA GOES, So GOES THE
NATION: A CASE STUDY OF A SUPREME COURT ELECTION IN THE POST-WHiTE ERA 4 (2004),

available at http://www.pmconline.org/files/pagoes.pdf
GOES].
35. Id. at 5.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 7.

[hereinafter

As PENNSYLVANIA
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polls. As Justice O'Connor has noted, when judges' employment
depends on popular election, their fate is tied up with every case
they decide. 38 We understand that this effect may be weakened in
a retention state like Pennsylvania, as opposed to states where
judges run for reelection in contested races, but we are more concerned with how this impacts initial selection.
Judicial candidates may feel pressured to espouse and later act
on opinions and views that conform to the prevailing popular opinion. The problem, of course, is that the judiciary is the branch
upon which we depend to act in accordance with the law, even
when it is unpopular to do so. The judiciary thus always has been
seen as protecting the minority against the tyranny of the majority. 39 But by electing judges, we turn this notion on its head. How
can a judicial candidate who espoused popular views act against
those views once on the bench? Will he or she risk the label of hypocrite or the taunt of "read my lips" when the law requires a decision that contradicts a view set forth on the campaign trail or
that is publicly unpopular?

E.

Do these Problems End for Jutdges Once They Reach the
Bench?

These unavoidable elements of the judicial election system exert
forces on judicial candidates that influence how they campaign for
the bench. Clearly, to earn the money, endorsements, support,
and votes one needs to run successfully statewide requires a lot of
work. The question is, what does that work entail and when does
it end?
For candidates who run for elected positions in the executive
and legislative branches, that work really begins once the election
is over. Once elected, those officials must begin to satisfy the
wishes of supporters who likely offered support in exchange for
the performance of campaign promises.

38. White, 536 U.S. at 788-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("if judges are subject to regular elections they are likely to feel that they have at least some personal stake in the outcome of every publicized case.").
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("This independence of the judges is
equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of
those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themiselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the
meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of
the minor party in the community.").
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For a judge, by contrast, that work-and all the relationship
building it entailed-in theory is supposed to end once the election
is over. But is that really possible? Perhaps more critically, even
if it is possible, does the public believe that is what actually happens? In the next section we will explore why the evolution of the
law applicable to the regulation of judicial elections has made
what was already a difficult task for future judges, as well as for
the watching public, nearly impossible.

111. THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS PRESENTS A
GROWING THREAT TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

Recognizing the inherent difference between judges and other
officials led the American Bar Association and many states, including Pennsylvania, to make some special distinctions in the
judicial election arena. 4 0 Primarily, these distinctions affect what
judicial candidates or sitting judges running for retention, reelection, or election to a higher court can and cannot do or say during
the campaign.
There were, until recently, two key components to these special
restrictions on judicial campaigns. First, the codes of judicial conduct limited the ability of judicial candidates to talk about hot
button issues and make promises about what they would do if
elected. Second, the codes set restrictions on how judicial campaigns were to handle fundraising. 4 '

The Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct adhered to both
these trends, with the practical effect that for many years, judicial
elections were low-profile affairs that didn't attract much media or
public attention. Money was raised, but not nearly as much as in
elections for legislative or executive offices. Candidates talked
about their experience and reputations, and avoided making any
controversial statements. 42
Much of this changed in the late 1990s and early 2000s when
legal challenges were brought against some state Codes of Judicial
Conduct. 43 In effect, these law suits raised the question: why
should judicial elections be different from any other elections?
40. See, e.g., Roy A. Schotland, Six Fatal Flaws: A Comment on Bopp and Neely, 86
DENy. U. L. REv. 233, 237 (2008) ("All [39] states that have chosen to have some or all of
their judges face some form of election have also chosen an array of state -constitutional
differences between the judges and other elective officials. We cannot ignore that array.").
41. See, e.g., PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 7B3(2) (2007)
42. See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 25, at 297.
43. See, e.g., White, 536 U~S 765.
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As a result of the ensuing litigation, judicial elections now look
very different than they did just a few short decades ago. Judicial
elections have become increasingly fierce; campaign spending has
skyrocketed, interest group involvement has increased dramatically, and debates over political speech have rocked the traditional
model. 4 4 Pennsylvania has not been immune from these changes.

A.

The Fall of the Speech Restrictions

The issue of the different rules governing judicial electionsparticularly the restrictions on what judicial candidates could say
on the campaign trail-came to a head in the case of Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White. In White, a judicial candidate for the
Minnesota Supreme Court alleged that Minnesota's announce
clause, the judicial canon prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues, violated
the candidate's free speech rights by preventing him from res-

ponding to voter and media inquiries about his

views. 45

The Min-

nesota Code provision read: "[A] candidate for a judicial office,
including an incumbent judge, shall not announce his or her views
on disputed legal or political issues." 4 6
The candidate argued that without being able to hear him speak
about his views, citizens and the press would be unable to make
an informed decision about whether to support or oppose his candidacy. 4 7
The Supreme Court held that the Minnesota canon violated the
First Amendment of the Constitution. Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia explained: "[T]he announce clause both prohibits
speech on the basis of its content and burdens a category of speech
that is 'at the core of our First Amendment freedoms'-speech

44. See, e.g., JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2006 15
(2006),
available
at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/NewPoliticsofJudicialElections2006 -D2A2449B377
CDA.pdf, JAMES L. GIBSON ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY ON THE
LEGITIMACY OF COURTS: A SUJRVEY-BASED EXPERIMENT, PENNSYLVANIA, 2007 1 (2008),
available
at
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p-mla-apa-research-citation2/7/9/4/8/pages279484/p27
9484-1.php; Pozen, supra note 25, at 265-66.
45. White, 536 U.S. at 769-70.
46. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000). At the time of
White, Pennsylvania's "announce clause" was identical to Minnesota's (Compare PA. CODE~
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 7B3(1)(c) (2000) with MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
CANON 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000).).
47. Wkite, 536 U.S. at 770.
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about the qualifications of candidates for public office."14 8 The
White Court, while recognizing the reasoning underpinning these
types of restrictions-maintaining judicial independence by keeping judicial candidates from seeming to prejudge cases or issues
while campaigning-held that states could not prohibit judicial
candidates from stating and discussing their views on disputed
issues.4 9
The dissenters in White relied on the differences inherent in the
judicial role, emphasizing that judicial candidates are unlike other
candidates for public office and that this uniqueness calls for certain restraints on speech. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued, "Unlike their counterparts in the political branches, judges
are expected to refrain from catering to particular constituencies
or committing themselves on controversial issues in advance of
adversarial presentation." 5 0 She thus argued that the speech restriction should be upheld.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence is most compelling to those who
study judicial elections and judicial independence because she
specifically addressed the impact of judicial elections on the protection of "an actual and perceived . .. impartial judiciary." 5 1 Justice O'Connor cited the inherent tension between the role of the

judiciary and the realities of electoral politics. 5 2 She also noted
the dangers inherent in the campaign process, particularly the
fundraising. 53 Justice O'Connor noted the risks of both actual and
perceived judicial bias in favor of campaign contributors and the
damage this does to the impartial judiciary, but she concluded
that these dangers were of the judicial election states' own making:
Minnesota has chosen to select its judges through contested
popular elections. . . . In doing so the State has voluntarily
taken on the risks to judicial bias described above. As a result, the State's claim that it needs to significantly restrict
judges' speech in order to protect judicial impartiality is particularly troubling. If the state has a problem with judicial
48. Id. at 774 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 861, 63 (8th
Cir. 2001)).
49. The announce clause was distinguished from a pledges or promises clause-which
was not challenged in the case-which prohibits judicial candidates from promising to rule
one way or the other on a particular issue.
50. Id at 803-04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 788 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 788-89.
53. White, 536 U.S. at 789-90.
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impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by
continuing the practice of popularly electing judges. 5 4
These words were prescient and foretold what was to come in
the arena of judicial elections. Justice O'Connor realized that the
Supreme Court's decision laid down a gauntlet to judicial election
states: if you want to elect judges, you must have real elections,
and restrictions on speech and other expressive conduct cannot be
justified by professed concerns for judicial independence. Again
and again in the coming years, this gauntlet would be slapped in
the faces of judicial election states: judges may be different, but
judicial elections won't be.
B.

Post-White

In the wake of White, many states
conduct to conform to the decision.
nia Supreme Court revised Canon
clause from the canon, although the
remains. Canon 713(1)(c) now reads:

revised their codes of judicial
For example, the Pennsylva7 by striking the announce
pledges and promises clause

B. Campaign conduct.
(1) Candidates, including an incumbent judge, for a
judicial office that is filled either by public election between competing candidates or on the basis of a merit
system election:
(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in
office other than the faithful and impartial performance
of the duties of the office; make statements that commit.
..the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court; or misrepresent their identity, qualifications, present position, or
other fact. 55

54.
55.

Id. at 792.

PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 7B(l)(c) (2008).. Although the post- White
revision maintained the prohibition on making statements that commit or appear to commit a candidate with respect to cases or controversies, in March 2008, as a result of Pennsylvania Family Institute v. Celhtci, 521 F. Supp. 2d 351 (E.D. Pa. 2007), the canon was
again amended with the resulting deletion of the prohibition against statements that "appeared" to so commit a candidate.
38 Pa. Bull. 1445 (March 29, 2008), available
at http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol38/38- 13/556.html.
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In a 2004 report, PMC analyzed the effect of the White decision
on the 2003 Pennsylvanian Supreme Court election, the first such
election following White and the amendments to the canons: "The
new canons were issued just before the start of the 2003 judicial
campaign season. Therefore, the 2003 Pennsylvania elections afforded an entire election cycle conducted under the new rules and
provided a good opportunity to study elections in the post-White
era." 56
The PMC report analyzed the operation of the election under
the newly relaxed speech restrictions. During that race, the two
candidates-Max Baer and Joan Onie Melvin-made very different decisions about whether to take advantage of the new freedom
to announce their views and the "question, to speak or not, itself
57
became the focus of debates and campaign trail rhetoric."
Baer and Orie Melvin engaged in a lengthy back-and-forth
about this topic during a televised debate:
Baer argued:
Judges have opinions, you wouldn't want a judge on the bench
who didn't have opinions, who didn't have sufficient life experiences, hadn't thought about things enough, didn't care passionately about society enough to have opinions. And where
Joan and I differ is that I'm willing to tell you mine, because I
don't think an ignorant voter, I don't think an ill-informed
voter is a good thing. I think you have a right to know what I
feel, what I believe in, who I am. And so I tell you, with the
caveat that I still am going to do my job as a judge. ...
[Orie] Melvin responded:
A judge's personal beliefs are totally irrelevant when you apply the rule of law in any judicial decision making process.
Members of the public need to believe that they have an even
playing field. When you are going out speaking on the issues,
the public believes there is a predisposition that this judge
will rule consistently with what their personal beliefs are.
Impartiality of the courts is a fundamental prerequisite to a
fair hearing, and that can be deemed compromised by appearances alone. So it is not a question of Max stepping out
and saying I will apply it and I won't use my personal beliefs.
56.
57.

As PENNSYLVANIA GOES, supra note 34, at 1.
Id. at 3.
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It's the appearance and the due process rights of litigants...
I have stated that I have a different view of Minnesota v.
White. They did not mandate that we speak out on the issues
in granting us First Amendment rights, and I feel that it
58
erodes the public's trust and confidence in the courts.
As noted earlier in this article, following White, the use of candidate surveys and questionnaires by special interest groups also
increased in Pennsylvania and throughout the nation. 5 9 Clearly,
judicial elections would no longer be the sleepy affairs of the past.
C.

White Transformed Judicial Elections Beyond the Realm of
Pure Speech

White thus marked a major sea change in the conduct of judicial
elections. But White was just the beginning. The trend in case
law post- White indicates a continual loosening of the restrictions
on judicial candidates. Some of these cases did not address simply
speech per se, but other candidate actions that were viewed as
expressive activity, including fundraising.
The issue of campaign contributions to judicial election campaigns has always been a cause for concern:
As a practical matter, so long as a state chooses to select its
judges by popular election, it must condone to some extent the
collection and expenditure of money for campaigns. Unquestionably, that practice invites abuses that are inconsistent
with the ideals of an impartial and incorruptible judiciary....
There is no aspect of the electoral system of choosing judges
that has drawn more vehement and justifiable criticism than
the raising of campaign funds, particularly from lawyers and

litigants likely to appear before the

court. 6 0

Because of such long-standing concerns, Pennsylvania and many
other states sought to address the unseemly issue of fundraising
in Judicial campaigns by prohibiting candidates from directly soliciting campaign funds themselves and instead requiring candidates to establish campaign committees to perform this task.
Thus the Pennsylvanian Canons provide:
58. Id. at 4-5 (quoting Televised Debate Between Max Baer and Joan Orie Melvin (Oct.
30, 2003)).
59. See supra pp. 829-30.
60. Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of Sup. Ct., 944 F.2d 137, 144-45 (3d Gin. 1991).

878

878

~Duquesne
Law ReviewVo.4

Vol. 48

Candidates, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office
that is filled by public election between competing candidates
should not themselves solicit or accept campaign funds, or solicit publicly stated support, but they may establish committees of responsible persons to secure and manage the expenditure of funds for their campaign and to obtain public statements of support for their candidacy. Such committees are
not prohibited from soliciting campaign contributions and
6
public support from lawyers. '
In theory, this restriction on direct solicitation of campaign contributions by candidates could prevent a candidate from knowing
who contributed to his or her election campaign, but in practice,
candidates generally attend their own fundraisers and also are
required to sign each campaign finance report that delineates the
donors to their campaign. In essence, this means that while the
candidate cannot "do the ask," he or she is very likely to "know the
answer"~ to the question ''who funded your campaign?''
This technical separation of the fundraising function from the
judicial candidate has not had the effect of easing public concern
about the influence campaign contributions and monetary support
can have on future decisions in the courtroom. The polls discussed
earlier in this article 6 2 reveal a steady, if not increasing, public
perception that campaign contributions are problematic, and may
reflect a growing belief that "justice is for sale." The post-White
cases have not helped reduce this perception.
After the speech restrictions began to fall, the next targets were
the prohibitions on direct solicitation by candidates. Most postWhite cases actually struck down bans on direct solicitation by
candidates, even though White had involved a very different issue. 6 3

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth, Ele-

venth, and Sixth Circuits in White

JJ,64

Weaver v. Bonner,6 5 and

61. PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CAN~ON 713(2) (2008).
62. See supra pp. 82 5-26.
63. See, e.g., Schotland, supra note 40, at 239 ("White does not touch this canon");
Simes v. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n, 247 S.W.3d 876, 881 (Ark. 2007)
("The solicitation clause fundamentally differs from the announce clause analyzed by the
Supreme Court in White"); see also Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court 2008 Term.
Comments: Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons of Caperton, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 80, 88 n.48 (2009) (noting that even the concurring justices in White highlighted the
issue although the case did not involve campaign fundraising).
64. Republican Party of Minn. v. White (White 1I), 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005).
65. 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002).
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Carey v. Wolnitzek, 66 respectively, found prohibitions on direct solicitation to violate the First Amendment. 6 7 Thus, the progeny of
White have integrated judges further into the money side of their
campaigns.
In Weaver, the Eleventh Circuit explained that prohibiting direct solicitation by candidates "completely chilled" expressive activity by judicial candidates while not actually protecting judicial
independence:
The impartiality concerns, if any, are created by the State's
decision to elect judges publicly. Campaigning for elected office necessarily entails raising campaign funds and seeking
endorsements from prominent figures and groups in the
community. . . . The fact that judicial candidates require financial support and public endorsements to run successful
campaigns does not suggest that they will be partial if they
are elected. Furthermore, even if there is a risk that judges
will be tempted to rule a particular way because of contributions or endorsements, this risk is not significantly reduced by
allowing the candidate's agent to seek these contributions and
endorsements on the candidate's behalf rather than the candidate seeking them himself. Successful candidates will feel
beholden to the people who helped them get elected regardless
of who did the soliciting of support.68
Similarly, in Carey v. Wolnitzek, 6 9 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit invalidated Kentucky's solicitation
clause, which prohibited in-person solicitations, solicitation of potential donors with pending cases, speeches to large groups, and
signed mass mailings. The court found the clause to be overbroad
by extending beyond those potential donors with pending cases.
The court also found troubling that although the canon prohibited
66. Carey v. Wolnitzek, No. 08-6468 (6th Cir. July 13, 2010).
67. See also, Kansas Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp.2d 1209 (D. Kan 2006), vacated and remanded in part by Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 562 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir.
2009,); Carey v. Wolnitzek, No. 3:06-36-KKC, 2008 WL 4602786, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 15,
2008) (applying strict scrutiny to Kentucky solicitation clause); but see Bauer v. Shepard,
634 F. Supp.2d 912, 953-55 (N.D. Ind. 2009) (upholding Indiana's direct solicitation ban).
In White HI, on remand from the Supreme Court, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated additional provisions of the code that prohibited judges from engaging in partisan
activity and personally soliciting campaign contributions. White HI, 416 F.3d at 766. But
see Siefert v. Alexander, 08-CV-126-BBC (7th Cir. June 14, 2010) (reinstating Wisconsin
prohibition against direct solicitation).
68. Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1323-24 (emphasis added).
69. 614 F.3d 189 (6th Cir. 2010).
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direct solicitation, it did not prohibit a candidate's knowledge of a
donation or an acknowledgement by the candidate of a donation:
Although the clause prevents judicial candidates from saying
"tplease, give me a donation," it does not prevent them from
saying "thank you" for a donation given. The clause bars any
solicitation, whether in a large group or small one, whether by
letter or one on one, but it does not bar the candidate from
learning how individuals responded to the committee's solicitations. That omission suggests that the only interest at play
is the impolitic interpersonal dynamics of a candidate's request for money, not the more corrosive reality of who gives
and how much. If the purported risk addressed by the clause
is that the judge or candidate will treat donors and nondonors differently, it is knowing who contributed and who
balked that makes the difference, not who asked for the contribution. 7 0
Currently, Pennsylvania's prohibition against direct candidate
solicitation remains in place. 7 1 But the line of cases following
White indicates that if challenged, there is a good chance that the
prohibition would be declared unconstitutional.
It remains to be seen how such a change would affect Pennsylvania judicial elections and whether it would engender even
greater public concern about the role of money in judicial elections. Certainly, some would argue that just as White permitted
but did not require judicial candidates to engage in more revealing
speech, a lifting of the direct solicitation ban might not result in
direct fundraising by judicial candidates. However, with the ban
lifted, potential donors might very well welcome the chance to
speak one-on-one with the future judge about a campaign contribution. It would likely be difficult for a judicial candidate not to
take advantage of the new freedom to directly solicit donors because donors might feel slighted if, under the new paradigm, a
campaign manager or treasurer made the ask. In such cases it
would be much harder, if not impossible, for a judge to plausibly
claim ignorance about who supported the campaign.

70.
71.

Carey, 614 F.3d at 205.
PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 7B(2) (2008).
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The Transformation of Judicial Elections

The post- White cases continued the transformation of judicial
elections begun in White. Following White, there has been an inevitable slide toward making judicial elections into "real elections." As the Weaver court explained when striking down prohibitions against judicial candidates using false or misleading
statements, "the distinction between judicial elections and other

types of elections has been greatly exaggerated.

...

7

Even if the distinction were alive and well before these cases, in
the aftermath of White, the demise of the distinction was at hand.
The Weaver court offers a compelling explanation for why this actually makes sense:
It is the general practice of electing judges, not the specific
practice of judicial campaigning, that gives rise to impartiality concerns because the practice of electing judges creates motivations for sitting judges and prospective judges in election
years and non-election years to say and do things that will
enhance their chances of being elected. 7 3
Justice O'Connor, then, had it right in her concurring opinion in

White: the threat to judicial independence is created by the judicial election process itself. Removing or reducing that threat must
be accomplished, not by crafting special rules to govern judicial
elections, but rather by finding another way to select judges.
Some argue that the "First Amendment should not be read to
require states to make a stark choice between conducting judicial
elections in a partisan fashion and doing away with judicial elections altogether," 74 yet the trend since White seems to be doing
exactly that. White is the beginning of the end of the justification
that judicial elections will be different because judges are different. Although it is difficult to argue with the logic of the White
decision, it is clear that this decision marks an important turning
point in the effort to maintain judicial independence by treating
judicial elections as special or different. The progeny of White
demonstrate a swift progression to transform judicial elections
into "real elections."
72. Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1321.
73. Id. at 1320.
74. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sandra Day O'Connor Project on the State of the Judiciary:
Republican Party of' Minnesota v. White: What are the Alternatives?, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1327, 1344 (2008).
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One More Nail in the Coffin-Citizens United v. FEC

The post- White cases demonstrate that White will be applied
again and again to hold that restricting First Amendment expressive activity is not the way to solve the problems inherent in judicial elections. Judicial campaign fundraising and the negative
perceptions it creates are among the most concerning elements of
judicial elections. The money problem is one that gives many
pause about electing judges. The money problem, however, will
not be solved by limits on candidate fundraising, which has been
deemed protected First Amendment activity. Moreover, the recent
trend in the Supreme Court's treatment of campaign finance regulations, which has been to strike down many such regulations,
seems poised to further exacerbate the problem of money in judicial elections.
A case decided earlier this year by the United States Supreme

Court, Citizens United v. FEC,7 5 confirms that the transformation
of judicial elections is essentially complete. In announcing a critical change in long standing First Amendment law as it relates to
campaign finance regulation, the Supreme Court drew no distinctions between judicial elections and elections for legislative or executive branch offices. 7 6 Clearly, the Court considered its decision
to be generally applicable to all elections.
The Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United, focusing primarily on the right to free speech, granted corporate entities (and
will apply to corporations and unions) a constitutional right to
make independent expenditures in elections directly from their
corporate coffers, without the need to establish separate political
action committees to fundraise and spend money. 7 7 The decision,
for all practical purposes, also invalidated the laws of Pennsylvania and 21 other states prohibiting such independent campaign
expenditures.
This case-a major watershed in campaign finance law-did not
specifically address judicial elections. To us, that is the key point.
The majority's lack of concern about how its decision might impact
judicial elections signals that the transformation of judicial elections was viewed as essentially complete. This did not go unnoticed, however. Justice Stevens in dissent lamented the effect of
the Court's decision on judicial elections: "At a time when con75. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
76. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 968 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 913 (majority opinion).
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cerns about the conduct of judicial elections have reached a fever
pitch . . . the Court today unleashes the floodgates of corporate

and union general treasury spending in these

races." 78

PMC issued a press release the day the Citizens United decision
was announced, arguing that the case likely would lead to more
expensive, contentious judicial elections that would continue to
undermine the appearance and reality of judicial independence:
In recent years, Judicial elections have become more like elections for other public offices, despite the fact that judges are
different from legislators and executive officers. Electing
judges in expensive, partisan contests complete with negative
ads, third-party spending, mass media campaigns and debates over "hot button" issues, makes it difficult to remember
that judges are sworn to be impartial arbiters of the law. Instead, people worry that popular opinion, personal bias, and
the desire to please campaign contributors or supporters will
sway judicial decision- making. This is unacceptable, but it is
the natural by-product of our electoral system. Justice Kennedy, writing for the 5-4 majority, discounted arguments that
campaign contributions and expenditures create the appearance of influence and would "cause the electorate to lose faith
in this democracy." However, he failed to consider that the
appearance of influence and access to judges already has been
shown to cause voters to lose faith in our court system. 7 9
If White and its progeny stand for the proposition that judicial
elections must be like elections for legislative and executive
branch offices, the application of Citizens United to judicial elections is the logical extension of those cases. As restrictions on
campaign fundraising, contribution limits and use of campaign
funds are challenged--challenges which we predict will successfully come-it seems clear that the floodgates for money in judicial
elections will open. In a recent speech to the National Association
of Women Judges, Justice Ginsburg offered a telling assessment of

78. Id at 968 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Press Release, Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts and PMC Action, U.S. Supreme
Court Lets the Money Roll In to Judicial Elections (Jan. 21, 2010), available at
http://judgesonmerit.org/2010/01/2llhistoric-u-s-supreme-court-decision-will-let-the-moneyroll-in-to- pa-judicial- elections/.
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the White decision: "[It was] the 'Gertrude Stein' decision:
election is an election is an election."' 8 0

'An

IV. WAS CAPER TON V. MASSEY THE INEVITABLE EFFECT OF THE
TRANSFORMATION OF JUJDICIAL ELECTIONS?

Last summer, the United States Supreme Court decided Caperton v. Massey, a case from West Virginia that asked whether Due
Process requires recusal when a major financial supporter appears
before a judge or justice whom his or her support helped to elect. 8 1
In Caperton, the plaintiff coal company was challenging the failure of a newly elected West Virginia Supreme Court justice to recuse himself from participating in the appeal of a $50 million verdict against the defendant. 8 2 The grounds for the recusal motion
were that the chief executive officer of the defendant coal company
had spent $3 million of his own money to support the election of
the justice and the defeat of his opponent. 8 3 The justice won the
election, twice refused to recuse, and twice cast the deciding vote
that overturned the verdict.8 4
The United States Supreme Court, in a five-four decision authored by Justice Kennedy, held that in some cases, circumstances-including the amount of the contribution, the proportional
size of the contribution related to other campaign fundraising and
expenditures, the probable impact of the contribution on the election, and the timing of the litigation-may require recusal because
"there is a serious risk of actual bias."8
The Court made clear that the inquiry is not whether there was
actual bias, but whether all the circumstances create too great a
risk of bias:
Although there is no allegation of a quid pro quo agreement,
the fact remains that Blankenship's extraordinary contributions were made at a time when he had a vested stake in the
outcome. Just as no man is allowed to be a judge in his own
cause, similar fears of bias can arise when-without the consent of the other parties-a man chooses the judge in his own
80. Robert Barnes, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Says She Would Forbid Judicial Elections,
WASHINGTON
POST,
Mar.
12,
2010,
http://www.washington
post.comlwpdynlcontent/article/2010/03/1 1/AF2010031 105136.html.
81. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
82. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2256.
83. Id. at 2257.
84. Id. at 2257-58.
85. Id. at 2263.
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cause. And applying this principle to the judicial election
process, there was here a serious, objective risk of actual bias
that required Justice Benjamin's recusal." 8 6
Without explicitly saying so, the majority acknowledged that
campaign contributions to judicial candidates can poison the
whole system. And the dissenters seemed to agree with this proposition. The Court, however, declined to set any guidelines for
how judges should make recusal decisions in future cases, and the
dissent argued that the majority opinion raised more questions
than it answered. 8 7
The justices' disagreement about how to address the issue of
judges presiding over cases involving lawyers or litigants that contributed to their campaigns demonstrates that there is no easy,
sure-to-succeed solution in the context of judicial elections. Money-no matter what the amount-will always be involved in judicial election campaigns, and the public will continue to worry that
the money could have a corrupting influence in future judicial decisions. After the oral argument in Caperton in March 2009, we
posted the following on our blog, JudgesOnMerit.org:
Lyle Denniston over at [SCOTUSblog] offers a short
of today's oral argument in Caperton v. Massey:

. ..

recap

Tugged between a sense that a constitutional ruling on
judges' duty to take themselves out of cases if bias is suspected should provide very clear guidance, and a sense
that it might be written only to apply in the most extreme
factual scenarios, the Supreme Court set itself a difficult
task....
Here lies the big challenge presented by campaign contributions-when do they cross the line from the cost of doing
business in a judicial election state to creating an impermissible appearance of bias. We think that's a tough line to draw,
88
even for the United States Supreme Court.

86. Id at 2265.
87. Caperton, 129 S. ct. at 2269-72 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts
actually presented forty questions about recusal that he contends remained problematically
unanswered by the majority's opinion. Id.
First Look at Caperton Argument,
88. JudgesonMerit.org,
[SCOTUSbiog's]
(last vihttp://judgesonmerit.org/2009/03/03/scotusblogs-first-look-at-caperton-argument
sited Aug. 18, 2010).
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As it turns out, we were right about how hard it would be for
the Supreme Court to draw those lines. But the real question is
should there actually be "costs of doing business" when it comes to
judicial selection? We believe there should not be. The inability of
the Supreme Court of the United States to provide clear guidance
to judges about how and when campaign contributions should lead
to recusal demonstrates that the problem lies in the Judicial election system itself, as well as the Court's own decision to treat judicial elections like elections for other offices.
The factual scenario presented in Caperton and the Court's inability to devise a way to address it going forward seem to be the
inevitable outcome of W~hite and its progeny-the end product of
transforming judicial elections into "real elections." Money has
always talked in elections, and now judicial elections are no different. The question is what happens in the courtroom after the election? Are judges different, such that the circumstances of their
election will not impact how they act in office? The Court had a
very difficult time answering that question. The facts of Caperton
made that particular case an easy one, but the Court could not set
out a set of bright line rules to govern elected judges generally.
This is troubling because it does nothing to solve the problems
caused by the influence of money in judicial elections. If judicial
elections are like all other elections, should the fact of campaign
contributions matter at all once the judge reaches the bench?
Some would certainly argue that it should not, but public opinion
makes clear that it does.
So, if the fact of the contribution matters, how and when does it
matter? That is the question that has been left open. Essentially,
Caperton signals that in judicial election states, business should
go on as usual. Keep electing judges, let contributions from lawyers and future litigants pour into judicial campaigns, and let
judges decide on their own-without clear guidance-whether or
not to recuse in any given case.
But that answer requires a sacrifice. There will be a decrease,
at least in the perception of-and possibility also the reality ofjudicial independence. We have long argued that treating judges
like other elected officials until the moment they take the bench is
antithetical to the fundamental notion that judges are different.
By essentially requiring judges to campaign, raise money, vie for
political endorsements, and curry favor with special interest
groups, judicial election states have erected a system that equates
judges with other elected officials.
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PENNSYLVANIA MUST DECIDE: Is ELECTING JUDGES MORE
IMPORTANT THAN PRESERVTING AND PROTECTING JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE?

Because elections make judicial candidates seem like all others
running for election to public office, elections foster the perception
that judges are not truly independent. The public needs to understand that judges are different and believe that judges act in accordance with their unique role. Judicial elections blur the critical
distinctions between judges and other officials by treating judicial
candidates like candidates for executive and legislative offices.
The public's perception of the judiciary is influenced by the
process by which judges reach the bench. 8 9 We cannot treat judicial candidates like politicians, make them act like politicians, and
then simply expect there to be a magic moment when they put on
judicial robes and new rules fall into place.
The current process requires us to believe that once elected,
judges become independent individuals free from the forces of political pressure, public opinion, campaign donors, or personal bias.
But as judicial elections have been transformed, that has become
more difficult for supporters to understand and for the public to
believe.
White and its progeny force Judicial election states to confront a
critical question: is judicial independence a commodity worth protecting? If so, these cases, as Justice O'Connor predicted in her
concurrence in White, tell us that doing so will require states that
care about judicial independence to put their money where their
mouths are and move away from electing judges.
Judicial elections are part of a broader ecosystem whose pieces are connected in complicated ways. The initial decision to
elect judges set into motion a series of potential consequences
for their performance in office. Subsidiary choices, such as
the Court's decisions immunizing independent expenditures
or judicial campaign speech from meaningful regulation, have
themselves changed the nature of judicial elections in ways
that may affect judges on the bench and shape the responses
available to protect litigants against a risk of judicial bias.
And the Court's ability to craft judicially manageable standards for dampening the constitutionally problematic consequences of judicial politics has its own political component.
89.

See, e.g., THE ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, supra note 8, at 2.
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Caperton is thus only the latest chapter in an unfolding story. 90
As we see it, if this "unfolding story" continues along its trajectory,
it will not have a happy ending unless judicial election states confront the choice that has been placed before them.
In Section 1, we argued that four features of elections create
special challenges to judicial independence. The transformation of
judicial elections under the line of cases discussed herein have
only exacerbated these challenges. The solution for Pennsylvania
and other states that prize judicial independence as a critical value worthy of protection is to find another way to select judges.
This way must honor the distinction between judges and other
elected officials, get judges out of the fundraising business, and
make clear that the judicial role is one that is accorded high value.
We believe the system best designed to do so is Merit Selection,
and we have been advocating for the adoption of a Merit Selection
system for Pennsylvania's three statewide appellate courts. 9 1 Merit Selection is a hybrid of appointive and elective systems that
includes an independent, bipartisan citizens' nominating commission to evaluate candidates and recommend the most qualified to
the Governor. The Governor must nominate from the commission's list of candidates, and the Governor's nominee is subject to
confirmation by the state Senate. After an initial term of four
years, the judge would stand before the public in a nonpartisan
retention election. If successful, the judge would serve a full tenyear term, after which he or she could again stand for retention
every ten years until reaching the age of mandatory retirement.
Merit Selection is designed to put the most qualified, 9 2 fair, impartial, and ethical judges on the appellate courts. It is a system
which honors the special nature of the judicial role and focuses on
90. Karlan, supra note 63, at 102-03.
91. Although judicial elections pose dangers at all levels of the court system, the problems inherent in judicial elections-especially the money problem-are exacerbated at the
appellate level. As a result, our current educational advocacy efforts are focused on implementing change at the level of the appellate courts. Most of the lobbying efforts are conducted by our affiliate organization PMCAction, a statewide nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that lobbies for court reform initiatives.
92. We emphasize qualifications because under the pending Merit Selection legislation,
minimum qualifications related to years of experience, skill, reputation for honest and
ethical behavior and judicial temperament would be required to be deemed qualified to
serve on the appellate courts. This is in contrast to the current electoral system, which
requires only that a candidate for the appellate courts be licensed as a lawyer in Pennsylvania, have been a Pennsylvania resident for one year, and have reached the age of 21. 42
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3101(a) (2005).
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the uniqueness of that role throughout the entire selection
process. In doing so, it eliminates the four major threats to judicial independence inherent in judicial elections: the money, the
need to seek political party endorsements, the need to obtain the
support of special interest groups, and the need to curry favor
with voters. We have repeatedly stated, "Merit [slelection puts
the focus on the questions that matter most when selecting an appellate court judge: Is this person well qualified to serve on the
bench and will he or she act impartially, honestly and with fidelity
to the law?" 93
The truth is that we don't know how different our judicial personnel would look if we were operating under a Merit Selection
system. We believe judges should reach the bench not because of
their fundraising prowess, campaigning ability, or because they
hail from the region with the largest voter turn-out that cycle.
Rather, individuals should reach the appellate bench because of
their qualifications, skills, and reputations for the highest ethical
behavior. We know there are many very good judges in Pennsylvania who certainly would be included among lists of highly qualified candidates for the appellate courts. But those judges reached
the bench despite the electoral system, not because of it. We need
a system that is designed to put that type of judge on the bench
every time there is a vacancy on the appellate courts.
We do know that under Merit Selection, Pennsylvanians would
no longer have to worry when they appear before the appellate
courts whether their opponent or the opposing counsel contributed
to one of the presiding judges or justices. No longer would any
money flow directly from a litigant or lawyer to assist a future appellate court judge in reaching the bench. This is how the system
should work. No one should ever have to worry about whether a
campaign contribution affected a judicial decision. It should not
ever be a consideration. But in our current system, it is.
If Pennsylvania truly values judicial independence as a commodity in both its forms-actual independence and the appearance of independence-it must take steps to protect and preserve
that commodity. The steps taken in the past-special restrictions
on judicial elections and judicial candidates-are no longer available. Bigger, more sweeping action is needed.

93. Shira J. Goodman & Lynn A. Marks, Use Merit Selection to Pick PA Appellate Court
Judges, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 22, 2010, at 7.
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The lesson of White, Caperton, and Citizens United is that judicial independence and judicial elections are mutually exclusive.
The time has come for Pennsylvania to make a choice. One commentator called White, Caperton, and Citizens United the three
"horse[men] of the apocalypse for lawyers, judges, and those who
favor the direct election of state judges. . . . [They] spell doom for
judicial elections." 94 We certainly hope he's right.

94. David Schenck, Guest Column: The End of Judicial Elections?, THE TEXAS
TRIBUNE, Feb. 2, 2010, http://www.texastribune.org/stories/2010/feb/02/guest-column-endjudicial-elections/.

